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To
the Editors [The New York Review of
Books]: After a two day conference in Havana with a group
of Cuban senior foreign-policy officials, Seweryn Bialer and Alfred
Stepan recommend that the United States take more positive steps to test
the sincerity of recent "public and private signals" that the
Cuban government wants "more peaceable relations" with the US. As Bialer and Stepan note, "[o]n other
occasions the US has ignored signals from its adversaries that they
wanted to negotiate in good faith." Not, however in the case of
Castro's Cuba. Without the benefit of the results of tests of such
signals from Havana (and of similar signals from the US to Havana) over
recent years, one is likely to conclude with Bialer and Stepan that
"the Reagan administration...is making a grave error", by
"increasing its pressure on Cuba" at this time. But a look at
these results may well lead one to conclude otherwise. In 1975, for example, the United States voted in
the Organization of American States to lift sanctions imposed on Cuba in
the early 1960s. The US also modified controls that prohibited foreign
affiliates of US companies from trading with Cuba and terminated all
restrictions on foreign flagships in the Cuban trade. Those gestures of
good will were, by all indications, made to pave the way for discussions
with Castro's representatives on the viability of a substantive
dialogue. In the face of the US initiative, Cuba intervened in Angola in
October 1975. Despite that failure, a new round of talks was
begun in 1977. The United States halted reconnaissance flights over Cuba
and lifted restrictions on travel to the island, and Interest Sections
were established in Havana and Washington. It is evident that American
actions were again perceived as a sign of weakness, for in May 1977 Cuba
increased its troops in Angola, and by December it had begun to send
soldiers to Ethiopia. In view of these Cuban actions, the US decided to
suspend initiatives on its part until the Cuban government showed some
restraint in Africa. This, of course, never happened. Not realizing that any lessening of pressure on the
Castro regime and any indication of willingness to blink at its
misconduct would be seized upon without delay, the United States made
new, indirect overtures, in December 1978. The State Department issued a
paper on "US Policy Towards Cuba" dealing with the
"important gains" made by this country through an increase in
"useful communications with the Cuban government." The report
recommended the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, provided that
Cuba improved its African posture and agreed on compensation for
expropriated US properties. As one might have expected from the earlier
pattern, a few months later it was learned that two Soviet brigades and
MIG-23s capable of carrying atomic weapons were on the island. President
Carter protested but finally accepted an explanation offered by the
Kremlin, and shortly thereafter Fidel Castro undertook his adventure in
subversion in Central America (a fact not even Castro now denies). The United States and Cuba have many areas of
common interest but few interests in common. There can no longer be
doubt that Castro's ultimate interest lies in implementing his
interpretation of the principle of proletarian internationalism which is
expressed in the Cuban Constitution with an emphasis on armed struggle
that is unparalleled in the charters of other socialist states.
According to the Constitution, Cuba has the "internationalist right
and duty" to "help...the peoples that struggle for their
liberation...," "espouses the principle of...the combative
solidarity of the peoples," and "recognizes the legitimacy of
wars of national liberation...and the right of the peoples to repel
imperialist and reactionary violence with revolutionary violence." Given recent experience of the US in its dealings
with Cuba and this constitutional statement of principles, it is no
wonder that current "US officials don't treat talks [with Cuba]
seriously." If the Cuban government has expressed some willingness
to "temper revolutionary feelings" and has shown
"feelings of vulnerability," as the authors of the article
report, it may well be because the Reagan administration has so far
indicated that it will not be passive in the face of Cuban provocations.
At least that much may already have been achieved by US non-complaisance
toward Cuba; beyond signals of good will, Cuban professions of interest
in "mutual restraint" may be signals that the current US
approach is correct. |
